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Abstract: Similar crashes or incidents may recur as a result of insufficient communication in uncer-
tain and risky situations that potentially threaten safety. The common root causes of insufficient
communication across a series of incidents and crashes must be explored in detail to prevent a vicious
circle of similar incidents or crashes from occurring. This study summarizes a series of incidents and
crashes (derailment due to excessive train speed) at JR West at the West Japan Railway Company (JR
West) that are considered to have arisen from insufficient communication. The incidents included (i)
resuming train service without confirming the number of passengers on board and leaving passengers
behind the station at Higashi-Hiroshima station, (ii) continuing train service in spite of an apparent
risk of a crash detected at Okayama station, and (iii) leaving the crack of the train hood as it was at
Kokura station. We discuss the causes of insufficient communication (particularly in relation to the
sharing of information) among the three branches of staff—the station staff, the conductor and train
driver, and the train operation management center—that led to the incidents or crashes. Two factors
contributed to the insufficient communication in the series of incidents and crashes: (a) Asymmetry of
authority, which hinders the discussion of issues openly and equally among the branches concerned.
(b) An unacceptable level of knowledge or information for all branches concerned.
Keywords: passenger railway transportation; crash; incident; insufficient communication; risk;
asymmetry of authority
1. Introduction
Careful and accurate communication is critical in a variety of activities and services,
such as air traffic, train or medical treatment services. Open and accurate communication
among staff is indispensable for safety. Insufficient communication is likely to lead to
incidents, crashes or malpractice, thus claiming many lives [1–13]. Barshi and Farris [14]
have discussed misunderstandings in aviation ACT communication from the perspectives
of linguistic properties and cognitive workload in communication. Owen [15] has discussed
human factors in emergency management and has shown that more open communication
styles facilitate more effective intra- and inter-team communication.
Open communication allows team members to share information and enhances their
comprehension of the situation. However, open communication is difficult when asym-
metry of information [16] or authority exists. The concept of asymmetry of information
was first proposed in economics and represents a situation in which one group has more
information than the other. This asymmetry creates an imbalance of power in a variety of
situations and leads to failures in economic activity, such as moral hazards or monopolies
of information, and hinders open communication, particularly in relation to the sharing of
information.
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Many studies have been conducted on team cooperation and communication [9,17–22].
Stahl [23] has proposed that understanding the characteristics of inter-group interactions is
important for enhancing team or group performance. Miller et al. [21] have shown that a
complex decision structure with different role holders must be considered in intensive care
unit communication so that miscommunications leading to malpractice can be prevented.
Keyton and Beck [18] have stated that sharing information is essential for open commu-
nication. Therefore, communication consisting of sufficient sharing of information must
be practiced to prevent incidents or crashes. Crew resource management is considered
an effective means to ensure safety in a variety of railway transportation services, such as
aviation or train services [9].
Insufficient communication is well recognized to trigger failures and eventually lead
to incidents or crashes in complex and large-scale systems such as railway transportation
services. However, the reasons why insufficient communication occurs have not been fully
explored. The following behaviors are not sufficient for preventing a vicious cycle of similar
incidents or crashes from occurring [24]: apologies in response to crashes or incidents,
and announcements of efforts for appropriate communication among staff without an
exploration of the causes of insufficient communication. Few studies have discussed how
the causes of insufficient communication create an undesirable state leading to incidents or
crashes.
The goal of communication is to recognize the meaning of information accurately,
exchange opinions bilaterally and equally (without asymmetry of authority or information)
and achieve an aim, such as enhanced safety or efficiency, through cooperation. Various
types of miscommunication exist. The most general miscommunication corresponds to a
situation in which information A from one side cannot be transmitted to the other side
as A. Even if information A from one side is correctly transmitted to the other side as
A, its meaning or interpretation might differ between sides. Generally, such types of
miscommunication are considered to cause crashes or medical malpractice in complex and
large-scale systems such as air traffic, train or medical services.
Communication error has become a leading cause of incidents in healthcare activ-
ities [25,26]. Swift [27] has reported that communication failures contributed to 27% of
medical malpractice claims between 2012 and 2016. On the basis of incident reports sub-
mitted by pilots and air traffic controllers, Wilso [28] has found that more than 70% involve
problems in communication. Tanino et al. [29] have reported that 38 of 148 railway inci-
dents at JR West were caused by communication errors. Omino [30] has reported 1706
cases associated with communication errors in JR groups (JR Hokkaido, JR West, JR East,
JR Kyushu and JR Tokai) between 1990 and 2016. Thus, communication errors contribute to
incidents or accidents to a large extent, and improving insufficient communication among
the branches is crucial to prevent severe incidents or accidents.
Other types of miscommunication hinder the sharing of information. The lack of
transmission of information A to one side, owing to the possession of information A by
the other side or the greater authority of the other side, induces miscommunication. If
one branch with greater authority is not willing to listen to and accept the important
information A transmitted by the other branch, the sharing of information and the open
communication between branches is hindered. Such types of miscommunication as a cause
of crashes or incidents are based on symmetry of authority or information and have not
been fully explored. Such types of miscommunication are expected to be triggered by a
closed or immature organizational safety culture or biased authority [31].
Since the derailment and crash of its Fukuchiyama line on 25 April 2005 [32–34], JR
West has repeatedly caused incidents at Okayama station [35–38] and Kokura station [39,40].
Although these incidents fortunately did not lead to disastrous crashes like that on the
Fukuchiyama line, we sought to explore why similar incidents occurred repeatedly, learn
from these incidents, and develop countermeasures to prevent another crash. We sought to
examine the repetition of similar incidents or crashes by identifying factors common to the
incidents, to extract a root cause from detailed analysis of similar incidents or crashes.
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Molesworth and Estival [26] have shown that communication performance is de-
graded when the workload imposed on pilots is excessive, and have concluded that
external factors contribute to miscommunication. The risk of incidents or accidents caused
by insufficient communication between a sender and a receiver is generally well recognized.
To prevent incidents or accidents associated with insufficient communication, recognizing
the triggers of insufficient communication in detail is necessary. However, few studies have
addressed incidents or accidents caused by insufficient communication from the viewpoints
of asymmetry of authority and unacceptable levels of knowledge or information.
The research hypothesis in this study was that insufficient communication was com-
mon among similar incidents or crashes, which recurred because of a lack of counter-
measures to remove the root causes and prevent insufficient communication. Moreover,
we hypothesized that asymmetry of authority or information and unacceptable levels of
safety-related knowledge or information underlie insufficient communication.
Miscommunication or insufficient communication in complex and large-scale systems,
such as passenger railway transportation systems, can cause fatal crashes. We investigated
the issue of insufficient communication underlying a series of incidents and crashes that
occurred at JR West. This study addressed the causes of insufficient communication
(concerning the sharing of information) among the relevant staff in a series of incidents and
crashes, which potentially pose safety-threatening risks. We additionally explored why
similar insufficient communication repeatedly occurred, from the viewpoints of asymmetry
of authority or information and unacceptable levels of knowledge or information, owing to
an underdeveloped open safety culture.
2. Similar Cases (Incidents or Crashes) at JR West Caused by Insufficient
Communication
2.1. JR West Higashi-Hiroshima Station Incident
The incident is based on the formal documentation of JR West (JR West formal docu-
ment number: 180708–000121 & 180802–000236). The JR West Hiroshima branch agreed
that the incident could be reported in an academic journal on the condition that valuable
lessons be extracted from the analysis of the incident to prevent subsequent incidents. The
outline of the incident is described below.
As rain continued, the readings of multiple rain gauges installed between Hiroshima
and Higashi-Hiroshima exceeded the reference value predetermined by JR West. At
Higashi-Hiroshima station, JR West formally announced to the passengers that continued
train service was impossible because of the weather situation (particularly the rain) and
the time needed for inspection and confirmation of safety.
Kodama No. 751 arrived at Higashi-Hiroshima station at 6:28 p.m., where its service
was suspended to allow the train operation management to monitor the situation and
assess whether further train service was possible. JR West later formally announced to
the passengers and the staff at Higashi-Hiroshima station that the train would stay at
Higashi-Hiroshima station, and service would not be resumed until the following day.
On the basis of this announcement, some passengers quickly booked overnight hotel
accommodations near Higashi-Hiroshima station. Moreover, many passengers went to a
nearby convenience store to purchase their dinner. The passengers received confirmation
from the station staff that train service would not resume until the next day, obtained
permission from the station staff to leave the station and went to a convenience store to
get dinner. Notably, JR West was unable to confirm the number of passengers and their
situations (whether they stayed in the train compartment, booked a hotel room for one
night or went to a convenience store to buy dinner).
JR West inspected the railroad track and confirmed that it was safe because the rain
had decreased to a drizzle and was below the reference value for suspending train service.
At 9:03 p.m., JR West decided to resume train service to Hiroshima station. In this manner,
the first decision to stay at Higashi-Hiroshima station until the next day was suddenly
revoked. Bound for Hiroshima station, the train left Higashi-Hiroshima station at 9:27 p.m.
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Although JR West knew that many passengers were on board, they did not recognize
the exact number of passengers on board when they decided to suspend train service
until the next day and made the according announcement. Consequently, the number of
passengers under such an uncertain situation could not be confirmed, and the behavior
of the passengers could not be completely understood. Therefore, the likelihood that
passengers were left behind at the station was high. However, JR West did not predict such
a situation at all. Open communication (exchange in opinions on the appropriateness of
the sudden decision change) among the staff is likely to be difficult in urgent and uncertain
situations. The outcome of changing the initial decision was that train service was resumed
without confirmation that all passengers were on board; consequently, many passengers
were left behind at Higashi-Hiroshima station.
2.2. JR West Fukuchiyama Line Crash
On 25 April 2005, a train derailed between Tsukaguchi and Amagasaki station, JR West
Fukuchiyama line, and hit an apartment building; 106 people were killed (including a train
driver), and 562 people were injured [32–34]. The train exceeded the pre-specified speed limit
of 70 km/h, thus causing the first and second cars to collide with the apartment building. The
automatic train stop system was not equipped with the track of the crash. The investigation
concluded that the direct cause of the crash was speeding. The train had overshot the predeter-
mined stopping position at Itami station before leaving for Amagasaki station, thus resulting in
a 90 s delay. The train driver broke the speed limit to recover from the delay.
Train drivers face financial penalties for delayed train service and are forced to par-
ticipate in harsh, humiliating retraining programs known as nikkin kyoiku (“dayshift
education”), including weeding and grass-cutting duties unrelated to the improvement
of driving skills. Ten months before the crash, the train driver had been reprimanded for
overshooting a station platform. Therefore, the train driver is speculated to have been
nervous about overshooting at Itami station, to have worried about the punishment for
having overshot the platform and to have been unable to concentrate on safe driving. The
insufficient communication among the staff is discussed in detail in Section 3.2.
2.3. JR West Okayama Station Incident
On 19 December 2017, JR West announced that a crack found in an undercarriage of a
Shinkansen bullet train on 11 December 2017 was approximately 44 cm in total from one
side of the undercarriage frame to the other [35–38]. The joint that transmits motor motions
to the gears was displaced, and the frame was deformed because of the crack, which was
about to break the frame and could have led to a derailment.
Approximately 20 min after the train left Hakata station for Tokyo station on 11 December
2017, at least one conductor noticed a burning smell. As the train approached Okayama
station, a passenger reported to a conductor that the air inside the train was foggy, so the
maintenance staff boarded the train at Okayama station and inspected the failure. Although
the maintenance staff confirmed an abnormal groaning sound and insisted that train service
should be discontinued, the staff at the Shinkansen general command center judged that the
sound would not affect safety and made a decision to continue train service. Without heeding
the warning by the maintenance staff at Okayama station that the risk of derailment was
high, the general command center decided to continue train service. Despite the detection of
an abnormal odor near Kyoto station, the train continued its service before it was forced to
stop at Nagoya station. Experts have warned that if the carriage had been fractured, the train
could have been derailed and resulted in a serious crash. JR West formally admitted that the
operator in the train operation management center made a judgement error in responding to
the report of an abnormality by the maintenance staff at Okayama station.
2.4. JR West Kokura Station Incident
At around 2 p.m. on 14 June 2018, approximately six months after the Okayama station
incident, a Shinkansen bullet train bound for Tokyo hit a man who entered the track area
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between Hakata and Kokura station without permission and committed suicide [39,40].
The train hit the man inside a tunnel approximately 17 km before Kokura station. Although
the hood of the train was cracked in the incident, none of the passengers were injured. The
train driver noticed an abnormal sound when the hood was damaged. Therefore, JR West
should have immediately inspected the train at the Kokura station to confirm whether
further train service was possible.
According to the operation center of the Sanyo Shinkansen bullet train, a Kokura station
employee found smeared blood on the train’s cracked hood. However, the station staff
reported the matter to the operation center only after the train had left Kokura station. In
response to the above-mentioned incident at Okayama station approximately six months
earlier, JR West announced that they would conduct employee training to ensure that train
service would be suspended for inspection and safety assurance whenever abnormalities
were detected. JR West also required train drivers and station staff to report even subtle
abnormalities to an operation center as soon as possible. Contravening this requirement, the
train driver and the station staff did not report the abnormality detected at Kokura station.
The repeated occurrence of similar incidents or crashes based on insufficient commu-
nication provides solid evidence that the investigations have been superficial and have not
scientifically identified the root cause common to series of incidents and crashes. Inves-
tigating why similar insufficient communication-based incidents or crashes occurred is
necessary to prevent the recurrence of similar incidents or crashes.
3. Discussion: Asymmetry of Authority and Unacceptable Levels of Knowledge or
Information that Inhibit Open Communication
Although insufficient communication among staff apparently contributed to the in-
cidents and crashes in Section 2, an exploration is necessary to assess why sharing of
information (enabling open communication among the staff) was impossible and the in-
sufficient communication induced incidents or crashes. The causes common to the four
cases above are discussed from the viewpoint of insufficient communication arising from
asymmetry of authority and unacceptable levels of knowledge or information.
3.1. JR West Incident at Higashi-Hiroshima Station
In the urgent situation that occurred at Higashi-Hiroshima station, none of the staff
noticed the risk of leaving passengers behind at the station after the sudden decision change
made under uncertainty (the number and behavior of the passengers were uncertain and
unknowable). The strong authority of the train operation management (general command
center) must have compelled the other branches (station staff and conductor and train
driver) to blindly obey the general command center’s command and prevented them
from predicting the risks accompanying the sudden decision change. The asymmetry of
authority hindered open communication among the branches.
Figure 1 shows that the three branches did not have equal authority. In addition,
they lacked the appropriate information or knowledge necessary for providing safe train
service and facilitating communication among the staff. The bold line with one arrow
represents the one-way (non-interactive) communication between two branches. The thin
line with arrows on both sides shows weak communication between two branches, a case
corresponding to the incident at Higashi-Hiroshima station, JR West.
Although the information or knowledge level must be above an acceptable level
to enable open communication of risks and safety issues in uncertain situations, the
knowledge or information level (the safety-critical knowledge, expertise or skills necessary
for decision-making under uncertainty and risk) of the three branches in this incident must
have been below the acceptable level, as described in the previous section (Figure 1). The
unacceptable knowledge or information also caused insufficient communication among
staff under the uncertain and risky situation.
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. . JR West Fukuchiyama Line Crash
Strong authority of the train operation management was als observed in the derail-
ment and crash on JR West’s Fuk chiyama line (Secti . ). lthough the direct cause
of the derailment and crash was excessive speed of the train, insufficient communication
among the station staff, the conductor and train driver, and the general command center
of operation management forced the train driver to speed, because the train driver feared
being blamed by the general command center for the delay. Because the authority of
the train operation management was greater than that of the train driver (asymmetry of
authority), as shown in Figure 1, the train driver could not admit to operational failure and
thus attempted to speed, to compensate for the delay and thus conceal the failure from the
train operation management. Even in this case, an insufficiently developed open safety
culture caused asymmetry of authority and hindered sharing of information among the
staff (regarding the delay of service because of to the train driver’s failure (overshooting
the predetermined stopping position at Itami station). In this manner, the train driver
exceeded the speed limit.
As described by Syed [41] and Dekker [42], such a situation is caused by the absence of
an open safety culture that promotes sufficient communication among staff without a fear
of blame for operational failure. Dekker [42] has suggested that placing blame undermines
workers’ ability to learn from failures and instead decreases the openness of failures.
Syed [41] has also described that fully disclosing incidents is necessary to learn from failures
and foster an open safety culture. If the train operation management had equal authority
to that of the other branches, and an open safety culture was in place that emphasized no
blame for failures, the train driver might have openly admitted to operational failure at
Itami station without fear of being blamed and might have avoided violating the speed
limit. Fostering such an open safety culture leads to open communication among staff.
Murata [43] and Murata and Karwowski [44] have suggested that cultural factors that
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hindered open discussion or communication regarding safety issues among Tokyo Electric
Company, the regulators and the government led to several organizational failures in
managing emergencies in the Fukushima Daiichi disaster.
3.3. JR West Okayama Station Incident
Strong authority of the train operation management was also identified in the incident
at Okayama station (Section 2.3). The maintenance staff at Okayama station confirmed an
abnormal groaning sound and insisted that train service should be discontinued. However,
the staff at the Shinkansen general command center optimistically concluded that the
sound would not affect safety and decided to continue train service. Although an abnormal
odor was detected near Kyoto station, the train continued service until Nagoya station.
The maintenance staff members at Okayama station were unable to disobey the decision of
the general command center, owing to asymmetry of authority, as shown in Figure 1.
The staff members with the greatest authority were unwilling to heed the proposal
by the maintenance and inspection experts, thus indicating that asymmetry of authority
hindered open communication regarding the risk of train crash and the recognition of
the risk. Although JR West required all staff to report even subtle events with a risk of
threatening transportation safety, the incident at Kokura station (Section 2.4) nonetheless
occurred. Therefore, countermeasures to eliminate asymmetry of authority or information
appear to have been insufficient. Even subtle safety-critical information cannot be reported
if the asymmetry of authority hinders open discussion. Therefore, some countermeasures
to eliminate the asymmetry of authority are necessary for open discussion of safety-critical
events among staff without asymmetry of authority, as shown in Figure 2.
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3.4. JR West Kokura Station Incident
Although the information or knowledge level must exceed the acceptable level to
enable open communication regarding risks and safety issues under uncertain situations,
the knowledge or information level (safety-critical knowledge, expertise or skills necessary
for decision-making under uncertainty and risk) of the three branches in this incident was
unacceptably low, as shown Figure 1. The asymmetry of information is apparent in this
case, because only the train driver and the Kokura station staff had the knowledge that the
nose of the Shinkansen bullet train was damaged by an unknown cause. Staff other than the
train driver had no information on the damage to the bullet train’s nose. The unacceptable
knowledge or information must have caused insufficient communication among the staff
under the uncertain and risky situation. In the Kokura station incident (Section 2.4), only
the train driver and the Kokura station staff had access to the safety-critical information
when the train arrived at Kokura station. Although the damage to the hood did not affect
the safe operation of the Shinkansen bullet train, the damage should have been quickly
and appropriately inspected at the Okura station to confirm whether the safety of train
operation was hindered and further operation was possible.
The information or knowledge level must exceed the acceptable level and have no
asymmetry, to enable open communication about risks and safety issues (Figure 2). The
knowledge or information level (the safety-critical knowledge, expertise or skills necessary
for decision-making under uncertainty and risk) of the three branches in the Kokura station
incident was asymmetric and below the acceptable level to promote open communication.
3.5. Summary
Because the Kokura station incident occurred shortly (six months) after the Okayama
station incident, this incident was criticized severely by many newspapers and television
broadcasts. After the Okayama station incident, JR West formally announced that they
had introduced a rule requiring all safety-critical information to be shared among staff
to increase railway transportation safety. Even after the Fukuchiyama line crash, JR West
formally announced that they prioritize the safety of passengers above all. However,
similar incidents have recurred, thus indicating that the root cause of the insufficient
communication, such as asymmetry of authority, had not been recognized, and these
incidents and crashes were not taken seriously. JR West does not appear to have a mindset
of learning from similar incidents and improving the communication skills of the three
branches to enhance the provision of safe train service.
As shown in Figure 2, the three branches must have equal authority, and their knowl-
edge or information must exceed the acceptable level to permit open discussion of risk
and safety, which is necessary for open communication and enhanced safety. The bold
line with arrows on both sides represents a bidirectional (interactive) and appropriate
communication. If the information or knowledge of all staff is below the acceptable level,
as in the case of the Higashi-Hiroshima station (Section 2.1) or Kokura station incident
(Section 2.4), the staff cannot recognize safety-critical information. Under asymmetry of
authority, as in the Higashi-Hiroshima station incident (Section 2.1), Fukuchiyama line
crash (Section 2.2) or Okayama station incident (Section 2.3), the staff cannot discuss safety-
critical issues openly and communicate. High authority does not necessarily correspond
to deep insights into safety-related issues, and asymmetry of authority and unacceptable
levels of knowledge or information might plausibly lead to incidents or crashes. Factors
such as asymmetry of authority have been extensively discussed and linked to the concept
of safety culture [31,45,46] or psychological safety [47–49].
A lack of open discussion regarding risks (including an exchange in opinions and
sharing of information) hinders cooperation to discuss safety-critical issues, such as the
risk of incidents, to eliminate asymmetry of authority or information, and to increase
information or knowledge levels. In the Fukuchiyama crash, the Higashi-Hiroshima station
incident and the Okayama station incident, the train operation management staff did not
allow the staff directly in charge of train operation to express their opinions openly, thus
Symmetry 2021, 13, 803 9 of 13
forcing them to obey the command with high authority. As indicated by Antonsen [31,45],
an underdeveloped open safety culture leads to exceedingly strong and unilateral authority
of one branch. Such an environment hinders the open communication that would enable
staff to openly discuss risks that threaten safety.
We discussed how an underdeveloped open safety culture caused asymmetry of
authority and an unacceptable level of information, thus hindering sufficient communica-
tion. Antonsen [31,46] has defined safety culture as the frame of reference through which
safety-critical information or knowledge is interpreted and appropriately communicated.
Weick [50] has stated that safety culture is a source for maintaining safety by serving as a
medium for the communication of safety-critical knowledge or information. Antonsen [45]
has emphasized the importance of two-way (bidirectional or interactive) communication.
Owen [15] has shown the importance and effectiveness of open communication styles.
The lack of knowledge to manage risks under uncertainty and the communication-
inhibiting effect of asymmetry of authority, as shown in Figure 1, prevents the teamwork
necessary for open communication and high performance [47–49,51]. The placing of blame
for failures does not necessarily prevent similar failures from recurring. As seen in the
derailment and crash of JR West’s Fukuchiyama line, this framework decreases openness
in failures, and important information is buried, or violations are committed to avoid
punishment or blame.
To promote sufficient communication and prevent similar incidents or crashes to the
crash in JR West’s Fukuchiyama line and the incidents at JR West’s Okayama, Kokura and
Higashi-Hiroshima station, two factors must be reduced as much as possible by fostering a
mature open safety culture and highly reliable organization [52–55] (Figure 3):
(a) Asymmetry of authority, which hinders sufficient communication to promote open
discussion of safety issues among the relevant branches.
(b) An unacceptable level of knowledge or information for all relevant branches.
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A high-reliability organization must practice continuous learning through feedback
from its own and others’ experiences of failure, adopt collective mindfulness toward safety
within the organization and foster a climate of open discussion on safety-related issues
so that factors (a) and (b) above do not lead to similar incidents or crashes arising from
insufficient communication.
4. Countermeasures for Removing Asymmetry of Authority and Enhancing
Safety-Related Knowledge or Information
This study demonstrated that similar incidents or crashes recur when organizations do
not fully recognize the safety-threatening risk of insufficient communication and attempt
to remove causes (a) and (b) of insufficient communication, as stated in Section 3.5. Open
communication promotes the sharing information by all members of an organization and
enables accurate comprehension of the situation. Therefore, to enable open communica-
tion, a safety climate must be fostered in which team members can speak up, exchange
constructive opinions and learn from failures, as suggested by Syed [41]. As shown in this
study, such a climate of open communication is difficult to create if asymmetry of authority
or shared information exists. An organization should recognize an undesirable flow from
an immature open safety culture to a failure of communication, as shown in Figure 3.
How to improve asymmetry of authority and unacceptable knowledge or information,
which are risk factors for insufficient communication, remains an important issue for
preventing incidents or accidents that stem from insufficient communication. We described
how the asymmetry of authority can be removed and the level of safety-related knowledge
or information can be increased. Inter- and intra-branch open discussions on safety-related
issues should be promoted through use of the following checklist. If each member has
negative feelings regarding the items below, the organization should take measures to
eliminate such negative feelings.
(1) The knowledge or information on safety-related risks is shared by all members within
branches so that the level of safety-related knowledge or information is enhanced;
(2) All members at each branch can speak up regarding safety-related issues on their
minds;
(3) Each branch can openly discuss safety-related issues with other branches.
Moreover, the following properties of high-reliability organizations should be fostered
to design a communication environment that enables workers to discuss issues openly,
collectively collaborate within an organization and avoid insufficient communication as
much as possible:
(4) Continuous learning through feedback from the organization’s own failure experience
and those of others;
(5) Collective mindfulness toward safety within the organization;
(6) Climate of open discussion of safety-related issues.
Judgments regarding operational safety without pressure from other branches due to
asymmetry of authority must also be enforced without placing blame, even if the judgment
impairs efficiency. The following countermeasures might be effective for promoting the
sharing of information and open communication. If an issue raised by one branch is not
resolved, and a solution to the issue is not fully agreed on by all branches concerned, a
decision to proceed with the solution should not be made. That is, when safety-related
issues are raised by one branch or one member in a branch, the next step should be
suspended until all branches agree that the safety issues have been addressed appropriately,
and no such issues remain. In this way, open communication supported by an open safety
culture is promoted, thus supporting the provision of safe railway transportation.
The knowledge and skills associated with handling risks under uncertain situations
should be enhanced routinely through open discussion among the involved branches.
Excessively relying on other branches because of the asymmetry of authority under low
psychological safety (safety culture) hinders willingness to master knowledge, acquire
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information, and increase knowledge and information regarding the safety-related issues
necessary for mitigating and preventing incident risk. Thus, the removal of asymmetry
of authority, the assurance of each branch’s independence through the countermeasures
described above and enhancing psychological safety (open safety culture) are essential.
This conclusion is consistent with that of Antonsen [31,46], who has examined the safety-
threatening risk of inter-group asymmetries in power and status on offshore supply vessels.
Antonsen [56] and Alvesson [57] also suggested the need of practice to remove asymmetry
of authority and create an open safety culture, which supports the discussion of this
study. The discussion for removing asymmetry of authority and enhancing safety-related
knowledge or information is summarized in Figure 4.
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5. Conclusions
On the basis of a discussion of why insufficient communication leads to a series
of similar incidents or crashes, this study explored the in-depth causes of insufficient
communication. The conclusions can be summarized as follows.
(1) The asy etry of authority, and unacceptable knowledge or information levels
underlying the insufficient communication, contribute to the occurrence of similar
incidents or crashes.
(2) An underdeveloped open safety culture causes asymmetry of information and unac-
ceptable knowledge or information levels, thus preventing sufficient communication
among staff, because a wrong decision or behavior is unlikely to be corrected under
strong authority that hinders open discussion.
(3) Without eliminating asymmetry of authority and enhancing knowledge or infor-
mation levels, similar incidents or crashes recur, particularly in large and complex
systems such as railway transportation systems.
(4) Fostering a high-reliability organization with a climate of continuous learning, col-
lective mindfulness and open discussion of safety-related issues can remove factors
such as asymmetry of authority, thus promoting open communication and preventing
additional incidents or crashes.
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Future research should verify the validity of the findings in fields other than railway
transportation systems (e.g., air traffic or medical services). Future study should also
conduct a simulation study to verify the findings.
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